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FOREWORD
As this monograph goes to press, the Department of Defense (DoD) is wrestling with
whether and how the Army is appropriately postured overseas. Judging from Congressional hearings and discussion in other public forums, there is an emerging consensus
that the Army has too much of its force structure based in the 50 States today, especially
if it hopes to achieve deterrence and assurance in Europe and northeast Asia. Dr. John
R. Deni’s study is a timely contribution to this national security conversation, combining
historical perspective with clear-eyed analysis and practical recommendations for rebalancing Army posture over the next decade.
The position—literally—that the Army finds itself in today was not the result of a
decision taken last month or last year. Rather, the Army’s current force posture is largely
the result of a vision laid out 15 years ago to return large numbers of troops from Europe
and South Korea to the United States. Dr. Deni examines the many reasons for this strategic realignment, which included claims of reduced fiscal cost, increased unit training
readiness, stronger diplomatic ties with partners and allies, increased family morale, and
a more benign strategic environment.
Dr. Deni then skillfully examines each of these claims to see what has actually transpired in terms of the costs avoided and benefits gained. He focuses his analysis on fiscal
cost, unit training readiness, diplomacy, and family readiness. Perhaps unsurprisingly
for an issue so complex and nuanced, the available data is somewhat mixed across these
issue areas. However, Dr. Deni finds that the preponderance of evidence points to the
conclusion that the DoD could achieve deterrence and assurance more efficiently and
effectively through a tailored increase in forward stationing. Specifically, Dr. Deni identifies a set of practical recommendations aimed at maximizing benefits and minimizing
costs—including fiscal costs—through a rebalancing of the Army’s forward posture and
the end of lengthy heel-to-toe noncombat rotational deployments. These implementable
recommendations are designed to enable senior policymakers to realign U.S. force posture for the next decade and beyond, in the hopes that a strategic perspective will help to
avoid hasty, wasteful decisions on where and how the Army is configured abroad. The
U.S. Army War College’s (USAWC) Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to offer this
study as a contribution to the unfolding national security debate about the role of the U.S.
military abroad and in the implementation of American foreign policy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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One day, historians will look back at what is being done today [with regard to
reduced overseas presence] and say that our actions helped to make the world
more peaceful, our military more formidable, and our freedom more secure.1
							

xv

—Donald Rumsfield

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For the purposes of efficiently and effectively assuring allies and deterring adversaries
in Europe and on the Korean Peninsula, the Army’s force posture is out of balance today,
with insufficient units and Soldiers stationed overseas. Since the end of the Cold War—
during which hundreds of thousands of Soldiers were stationed overseas—the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of a U.S.-stationed Army, yielding an over-reliance
on rotational deployments for continuous heel-to-toe presence to achieve deterrence and
assurance effectively and at reasonable, sustainable cost.
The preceding assessment is the result of a 10-month study examining the costs and
benefits—defined broadly—of rotational deployments versus forward stationing. Not all
of the available quantitative and qualitative data point in the same direction. There are
indeed a myriad of sometimes conflicting costs and benefits that must be considered in
determining whether and how U.S. Army posture has become unbalanced and what to
do about it.
In light of data and other evidence from actual rotations to Europe and South Korea
over the last 2 to 3 years, the original arguments in favor of rotational presence do not
appear as valid today. This recent evidence essentially undermines the claims made in
2003-2004 and again in 2010-2011 that the Department of Defense (DoD) could achieve
key objectives such as deterrence and assurance more effectively and efficiently through
increased reliance on Army rotational presence in lieu of forward stationing. Other key
findings of this study include the following:
• There is strong evidence to support the conclusion that in the cases of both Europe
and South Korea, the DoD is spending more than was originally anticipated to
maintain heel-to-toe rotational presence.
o Rotational heel-to-toe presence is more expensive than forward stationing
when the units in question are armored units taking their own equipment on
each rotation and when investments already made in extant infrastructure in
the United States and overseas are excluded.
o This conclusion very likely applies to other equipment-intensive units such as
combat aviation brigades or air defense units.
• In terms of diplomatic or political-military factors, forward stationing is preferred
by American allies overseas over rotational deployments. Allies perceive forward-stationed forces as a sign of a stronger, more enduring commitment from
the United States.
o The material benefits that accrue to host nations often mitigate the downsides
associated with American military presence, such as increased noise levels.
• From a family readiness perspective, there is strong anecdotal evidence indicating
both families and Soldiers are dissatisfied with the shift to a U.S.-stationed force.
o Soldiers and families perceive they are being asked to take on many of the
same hardships as for a wartime rotation, but without the moral and material
rewards of a combat tour.
o This strong anecdotal evidence appears to be reflected by lower reenlistment
rates for some rotationally deployed units during the 12 months following
their rotations to Europe or South Korea. However, it is premature to label this
a causal relationship.
xvii

•

In terms of unit training readiness, rotationally deployed units arrive in theater at
a higher level of readiness for decisive action, and their very high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) allows them to maintain that level of readiness throughout their
9 to 10-month deployment. This is appealing to some senior U.S. commanders on
the ground in Europe and Korea, who contend that the higher level of activity
while in theater bolsters assurance and deterrence. Especially in the case of Korea,
rotational deployments have brought a higher degree of stability, reducing the
personnel churn that broke up crews and small teams.
o However, it is highly unlikely that America’s adversaries or its allies recognize
or care about the differences between an active duty armored brigade combat
team (ABCT) that has just conducted a National Training Center (NTC) rotation and one that has not.
o Moreover, the training readiness advantages of a rotationally deployed unit are
balanced out by the significantly higher manning rates of forward-stationed
units and the fact that forward-stationed units typically are more knowledgeable of foreign culture, military units, geography, political leaders, and military counterparts. Forward stationing yields more interoperable, culturally
proficient forces.

The DoD has begun to recognize it needs to restore balance to the Army’s overseas
force posture—the DoD has earmarked additional force structure for forward stationing
in Europe, as part of an increase in end strength authorized by the 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA). Nonetheless, compelling evidence as presented in this study
points to the conclusion that the DoD can more effectively and efficiently deter and assure
through an increase in Army forward stationing beyond that which exists today.
Along these lines, the study makes the following recommendations:
1. To minimize the negative morale associated with 9 to 10-month heel-to-toe rotational deployments that lack the same moral and material benefits of a combat
tour, the Army should end such rotations and instead conduct shorter-term, periodic, but regular rotations to South Korea and Europe. The Pacific Pathways
initiative may provide a useful model.
2. To minimize recurring fiscal costs, the United States should forward station in
Europe and South Korea heavy and/or equipment-intensive units, instead of rotationally deploying them.
3. To maximize the advantages of tactical, operational, and strategic interoperability
that come with forward stationing, the United States should forward station those
units that require the greatest depth of knowledge of local rules, regulations, customs, terrain, airspace, and/or counterpart units and officials.
4. In the case of Europe, the Army should forward station, for example, an ABCT
as well as combat aviation, air defense, and division-level command and control
units and related enablers in order to achieve sustainable deterrence and assurance.
5. U.S. forces forward-stationed in Poland—in whole, or in part, through split-basing—would provide greater assurance to Eastern Europe and more effectively deter aggression than rotational forces. Therefore, notwithstanding the restrictions
xviii

6.

7.

8.
9.

imposed by the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Russia Founding Act
and taking into consideration the significant changes in Russian foreign policy,
security strategy, and force posture over the 2 decades since the signing of the Act,
the DoD should pursue a policy of forward stationing additional force structure in
Poland. Doing so would produce greater assurance and deterrence effects relative
to stationing in Western Europe; and the Polish Government has evinced a willingness to share some of the costs of construction and base operations.
If forward stationing of additional, appropriate force structure cannot be achieved
in Poland, forward stationing in Germany is a cost-effective alternative that would
bolster assurance and deterrence through the return of armor, combat aviation,
fires, command and control, and other critical enablers to Central Europe.
o However, in this situation—and in order to control fiscal costs and negative
impacts on morale—the United States should end the heel-to-toe armor presence across Eastern Europe provided by continually rotating forces from the
continental United States.
o Instead, the United States should continue to maintain heel-to-toe presence of
a battalion-sized unit—sourced from forward-stationed armored, Stryker, and
other forces—in Poland under NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) initiative.
o The constant presence of U.S.-sourced armored rotational forces elsewhere
across Eastern Europe is very appealing to some field commanders, largely
because of high unit training readiness and high OPTEMPO. However, this
study suggests that given the array of costs and benefits associated with long
duration, continuous rotational deployments, the United States could maintain
adequate assurance and deterrence more effectively and efficiently by relying
on occasional, short-term deployments across Eastern Europe of armor and
other capabilities sourced from units forward-stationed in Europe and occasionally augmented by other short-term deployments of lighter units sourced
from the United States.
In the case of Korea, the Army should return to a forward-stationed ABCT, and
it should maintain combat aviation, air defense, and division-level command and
control units and related enablers there. With the completion of construction at
Camp Humphreys, the Army should also normalize tours for the ABCT and as
many other units as possible, to reduce personnel churn and to reinforce the strong
U.S. commitment to South Korean defense.
When periodic, shorter-term rotational deployments are necessary in Europe or
northeast Asia, the DoD and the Army should rely on infantry brigade combat
team (IBCT) or Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) units.
The DoD should try to increase Army forward stationing through growth in Army
end strength rather than through relocating a unit that is already stationed in the
United States.
o When the executive branch leads forcefully on these issues, it nearly always
overcomes Congressional resistance, even when relocating an extant unit from
a U.S. facility to an overseas location, based on historical precedent.
xix

o In any case, the DoD will need to achieve a strong interagency consensus on
the importance of increased forward presence, and it will need to continually
inform Congress of the benefits in terms of morale and family readiness, fiscal
cost, diplomacy, and interoperability.
Regardless of the specific overseas force posture adopted by the United States or the
particular blend of rotationally deployed forces and forward-stationed forces ultimately
arrayed in Europe and South Korea, the Army and the DoD must engage in a careful
study of the alternatives. Analysis must precede conclusions, not the other way around.
Recent history has shown that to do otherwise, for example, in order to achieve shortterm objectives or fulfill myopic political imperatives, can waste taxpayer money and
strategically disadvantage the United States.
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ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS VS. FORWARD STATIONING:
HOW CAN THE ARMY ACHIEVE ASSURANCE AND
DETERRENCE EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY?

INTRODUCTION
Over the last 2 decades, the Army has increasingly become a U.S.-stationed force;
shifting most of its routinely forward-stationed forces back to the United States (see
Tables 1 and 2). For the most part, restationing was done in order to save money, under
the expectation that it would be cheaper to base U.S. Army forces in the United States
than overseas. Whether and how this has been an efficient and effective use of limited
resources has been the subject of significant deliberation among practitioners and academics. Until very recently, though, there was little actual quantitative data available on
the costs associated with a robust Army rotational presence model, the likes of which are
seen today in East Asia and Europe.
The forward posture of today’s Army did not emerge suddenly or even over the
course of a couple of years. Instead, today’s Army posture is the product of a plan that
was largely developed and put into motion over 15 years ago.

Table 1. Percent of U.S. Army Forces Stationed in Europe and East Asia.2

1

In order to begin planning for what the Army’s posture might be 15 years from now,
military leaders must consider the relative merits of permanent forward presence versus
rotational forward presence as tools for achieving a variety of U.S. national security
objectives. For instance, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to consider whether one
or the other is better at achieving deterrence and of reassuring allies and partners. Fiscal
costs must of course be considered, in addition to the impact on families and troops.
Political-military factors also must be weighed in trying to discern which model of forward presence achieves broad U.S. objectives. In short, there are several variables that
can influence assessments of what is better.

Table 2. Percent of U.S. Army Forces Stationed in the United States and U.S.
Territories.3
This study examines many of these factors—that is, the relative costs and benefits,
broadly defined—of recent and current fiscal year (FY) forward stationing and rotational
presence efforts in South Korea and Europe. It will assess these two presence tools in the
context of deterring American adversaries and assuring American allies. Although the
study will be retrospective in its analysis, it will also provide a decision-making and risk
assessment framework for senior defense civilians and military officials that will assist
them in determining where one form of presence may be more effective or efficient than
the other, depending on strategic, operational, and/or tactical objectives, as well as other
factors.
This study is necessary in order to inform future presence decisions. To begin shaping
the most efficacious force posture for the next decade or more, policymakers must begin

2

today to develop a long-term plan and build a political and organizational consensus.
This study is a contribution to that effort.
Definitions and Study Parameters
As mentioned above, this study is concerned primarily with whether and how the
United States employs overseas military presence to achieve two goals—deterrence and
assurance (see Figure 1). It is therefore not terribly concerned with whether and how
various presence models support current operations in places such as the Middle East or
Afghanistan, or whether those presence models support future operational access. These
are certainly important goals for the U.S. military to concern itself with, but they are outside the scope of this study.
This study treats deterrence as the ability of the United States to influence Moscow’s
decision-making vis-à-vis U.S. and Allied vital interests. Specifically, deterrence is the
ability of the United States to convince Moscow that likely costs outweigh the likely
benefits of any aggression aimed at undermining those vital interests, however they are
defined and assuming they are clearly articulated and communicated to Moscow. Deterrence can be achieved through the promise of punishment, following an act of aggression,
or through denial, essentially preventing or indefinitely delaying an act of aggression.

Figure 1. Study Parameters.
If deterrence is aimed at potential adversaries, assurance is aimed at allies. Assurance
is treated in this study as the ability of the United States to convince allies of its ability
and willingness to make good on its alliance responsibilities. Note that this comprises
two necessary and sufficient elements—the first (ability) is usually thought of in terms of
both capability and capacity, and the second (willingness) is typically viewed in terms of
political commitment.

3

Obviously, neither of these concepts is easily measured in quantitative terms. In fact,
it is difficult to measure deterrence even in qualitative terms. Whether deterrence is working can only be implicitly measured, based on the absence of certain policies or rhetoric—
such as a military incursion—as well as the presence of other policies or rhetoric—such
as leadership statements on official policy. Nonetheless, with regard to less-than-transparent authoritarian states like Russia, deterrence is especially difficult to assess.
Assurance is similar to deterrence in that it is difficult to measure in concrete terms.
However, it is certainly easier to measure in qualitative terms than deterrence. For
instance, public and private statements of key political leaders in allied countries can
provide U.S. officials with a fairly clear sense of whether those allies are assured by U.S.
actions and policies. Subjective analyses conducted by think tanks or academics can also
provide Washington with a sense of whether its chosen policies and its forward posture
are assuring allies. Hence, although certainly not an exact science, measuring assurance
is markedly easier than measuring deterrence.
This study seeks to examine deterrence and assurance in terms of whether the United
States is achieving those objectives efficiently and effectively. The first of these parameters—efficiency—involves trying to determine which presence option or options achieves
U.S. objectives with fewer costs over time. This study defines costs in broad terms including budgetary or fiscal costs, human costs such as impacts on family well-being and
morale, and diplomatic costs such as impacts on relationships with key allies and potential adversaries. Time is also a factor to consider here—whether a particular presence
option can be sustained over time is a determinant of its efficiency.
With regard to effectiveness, this study will attempt to determine which forward
presence option or options achieve U.S. deterrence and assurance objectives more easily,
speedily, and/or completely. Measuring effectiveness in national security is a challenging task because, for the most part, it is nearly impossible to quantify what is inherently
qualitative, such as the sense of assurance among U.S. allies. Nonetheless, measuring
effectiveness has become especially popular among national security decision-makers
in an era of constrained or shrinking resources—military and civilian executive branch
leaders and their overseers in the legislative branch want to ensure every defense dollar
is spent wisely. This demand signal can lead to at least two problematic tendencies. First,
there can be a tendency to confuse the measurement of effectiveness with the measurement of performance. The latter addresses merely whether tasks or activities have been
accomplished, while only the former addresses how well they have been accomplished.
The second problematic tendency is to score qualitative factors by assigning numerical values and hence manipulate them in the same way that truly quantitative data might
be. This is inherently risky because it suggests a degree of objectivity and rigor that is
often not substantiated. Qualitative assessment employs multiple methods, including
field interviews as well as analysis of primary and secondary sources, and rests fundamentally on interpretation by critically thinking analysts. This study assesses effectiveness primarily through reliance on interpretative analysis of qualitative factors.
Finally, as noted earlier in the introduction, this study is focused entirely on forward
presence in Europe and South Korea. The Army also employs a combination of rotational
deployments and forward stationing in Latin America and the Middle East, but these
regions are outside the scope of this study. Instead, this study confines its analysis and
4

recommendations to Europe and South Korea, per the terms of the study proposal made
to and agreed upon by the senior Army leadership.
Methodology
This study is based on a wide variety of information sources. Personal research
interviews and discussions were conducted or email correspondence exchanged with
over 70 individuals from U.S. and allied military and civilian officials based in Europe,
South Korea, and North America. These were greatly facilitated by research trips to U.S.
European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) in August 2016; to
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) in December 2016; to U.S. Army Pacific
(USARPAC) in January 2017; and to 8th Army Headquarters and 2nd Infantry Division
Headquarters in February 2017.
In addition to these organizations, a wide variety of others were directly contacted
and engaged in the effort to find raw data, other relevant primary sources, and secondary
source analyses and studies. These other organizations and entities included:
• 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment;
• 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division;
• 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division;
• 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division;
• Center for Army Lessons Learned;
• Marine Corps Forces, Pacific;
• U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral & Social Sciences;
• U.S. Embassy Seoul;
• German Ministry of Defence;
• Polish Ministry of Defence;
• Canadian Embassy Washington, DC;
• United Kingdom (UK) Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO); and,
• UK Embassy Tallinn.
The Way Ahead
Following this introduction, this study will next address trends in overseas stationing.
Understanding when, why, and how the Army became largely U.S.-stationed is critical
to determining whether the Army and the DoD more broadly are better off today—in
terms of the aforementioned parameters—than before the shift. Understanding the recent
history of the Army’s shift can also help to inform decisions the Army and the DoD might
wish to make to overseas posture moving forward.
This study will then attempt to assess whether the arguments used to justify the relocation of most of the Army’s forward-stationed presence have held up in light of recent
data and other evidence from the last 2 to 3 years. This time period—from late 2014 when
the United States began regular rotations of U.S.-stationed units to Europe, and from mid2015, when the United States began rotating full brigade combat teams from U.S. bases to
South Korea—has yielded a great amount of evidence on fiscal costs, readiness, morale,
and diplomatic implications. This section will include an illustrative cost comparison
5

between a forward-stationed armored brigade combat team (ABCT) and a U.S.-based
ABCT. An ABCT was chosen as the unit for comparison because it is the centerpiece of
the heel-to-toe rotations occurring currently in Europe. Of course, an ABCT is only one
element of effective and efficient deterrence and assurance in Europe and South Korea.
Next, the study will examine what the Army might learn from other countries—and
other U.S. services—that are also engaged in regular overseas rotations that are not tied
to particular combat operations. The U.S. Marine Corps has, since 2012, been sending
units of various sizes to Darwin, Australia for several months each year. More recently,
Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom have joined the United States as framework
countries for NATO’s new enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) initiative in the Baltic States
and Poland. The lessons gleaned from these rotational deployment initiatives may help
to inform unfolding Army efforts in Europe and South Korea.
Finally, the study will conclude with an assessment of key findings and recommendations. The shift to a U.S.-stationed Army is having—and will continue to have—profound
implications for how the Army fulfills its missions and for how the United States achieves
security and stability in areas of vital interest. Assessing the situation to date is critical to
positioning the Army and the DoD to make adjustments to its posture now—adjustments
that are likely to unfold over many years.
TRENDS IN OVERSEAS STATIONING
The U.S. forward-stationed presence in Europe has been steadily decreasing since the
early 1990s, when the Cold War ended. With the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the original rationale for U.S. forward presence in Europe—defending NATO
allies from a conventional attack by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces—practically vanished. New security challenges arose in place of the Soviet threat—ethnic, religious, and
socio-economic tensions that had been held in check by the bipolar security structure
suddenly burst open in places such as Bosnia. Moreover, European concerns over the
residual capability of a diminished but still potentially threatening Russian military—as
well as the uncertain trajectory of a recently reunited Germany—meant that there would
be a limit to the scope and pace of U.S. force reductions in Europe in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, even before the Soviet Union formally collapsed, the number of U.S.
Army troops assigned to Europe began to steadily fall starting in the early 1990s. In some
instances, such as in the case of most of the units in the Army’s VII Corps stationed in
Germany, units that deployed from Europe to the Persian Gulf War redeployed directly
to the United States.4
The drawdown of U.S. Army forces in Europe gained new momentum in 2004, with
the completion of the Integrated Global Posture and Basing Study (IGPBS) and the publication of the Bush administration’s report to Congress on “Strengthening U.S. Global
Defense Posture” as depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. “Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture,” Report to Congress, 2004.5
Although most of the details of the posture plan were contained in a classified annex, the
publicly released report featured the broad outlines of the restationing plan that would
be largely carried out over the next 10 to 12 years.6 These included:
• The removal of heavy maneuver forces from Europe—this meant the return of all
U.S. tank units from Europe.
• The retention of just Stryker and airborne units as the only forward-stationed
ground maneuver units in Europe—ultimately, this meant that only the 173rd
Airborne and the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment would remain as U.S. ground
maneuver units forward-stationed in Europe.
• Reliance on rotational presence to achieve a brigade combat team (BCT) presence
split between Bulgaria and Romania.
• A leaner command and support structure in Europe—this entailed the return of V
Corps Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division Headquarters, and 1st Armored Division Headquarters to the United States, as well as numerous combat support units.
• In South Korea, a drawdown in total U.S. forward-stationed forces from 38,500
to 25,000.
• Increased reliance on rotational units to complement forward-stationed units on
the Korean peninsula.
• Consolidation of U.S. forces south of Seoul and away from its increasing congestion and sprawl.
• The maintenance of a robust prepositioned equipment capability in Korea.
Before the Bush administration ended its second term, the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters and its subordinate brigades and other units had relocated to the United States
or were inactivated. Additionally, plans were announced to transfer 1st Armored Division Headquarters and most of its subordinate brigades and other units to the United
States.7
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When the former Obama administration entered office in 2009, it initially put plans
for drawing down beyond that which had occurred to date on hold. This decision was
captured in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report, depicted in Figure 3,
which noted that pending “assessment of our European defense posture network, the
United States will retain four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps headquarters
forward-stationed on the continent.”8

Figure 3. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report.9
However, not long after that, the Obama administration decided to continue with
the broad outlines of the plan developed nearly a decade prior under President Bush.
In Europe, this meant leaving only the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment and the 173rd airborne brigade forward-stationed—in terms of ground maneuver units—and removing
two other brigades (170th and 172nd) as well as V Corps and the 1st Armored Division.10
Overseas reductions were considered critical elements in the broader inactivation of
Army force structure that was necessary following the passage of the Budget Control Act
of 2011 and the end of major combat operations in Iraq. Using the Military Value Analysis
(MVA) model and other analytical tools, the Army determined that in dropping from 45
to 33 BCTs, it would cut 2 BCTs from Europe (the aforementioned 170th and 172nd) and
10 BCTs from its force structure in the United States, as well as reorganize the remaining
BCTs by, for example, adding a third maneuver battalion to most.11 Later, in November
2014, the Army announced it would cut an ABCT from South Korea and replace it with a
rotationally deployed brigade from the United States.12
At the political level, the reasons relied upon by both the Obama and Bush administrations to justify the drawdown of forces and the shift toward rotational presence, as well
as the arguments used by Congressional supporters of the drawdown, were manifold.
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The next section examines the most common and compelling arguments relied upon by
those that favored reducing military stationing overseas, especially in Europe, in favor of
increased stationing in the United States and the use of rotational deployments to maintain some degree of overseas presence.
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A U.S.-STATIONED FORCE
Fiscal Costs
It has long been generally assumed that it is cheaper to base American military forces
in the United States, and throughout the last 15 years, cost factors were routinely cited
as a major reason for shifting from a forward stationing posture.13 This is especially so
relative to Germany and other European locations, where U.S. military bases include
infrastructure such as schools and commissaries that may not be necessary at military
facilities in the states. Per the terms of agreements negotiated with the United States,
Germany and Italy also do not provide as much direct reimbursement for the presence of
U.S. Army forces on their territory, certainly not to the extent spelled out in agreements
with South Korea or Japan. Moreover, Pentagon officials specifically argued that permanent change of station (PCS) costs would be reduced, since the Department would not be
transferring as many Soldiers and families across the ocean.14
Some in Congress questioned whether it would cost more to deploy forces from the
United States in a time of crisis than it would to already have those forces stationed
overseas.15 The Congressionally-mandated Overseas Basing Commission expressed the
same concern.16 Executive branch officials, particularly of the Bush administration, did
not think these concerns were valid given the unknowability of where American military
forces would be deployed in the future.
Nevertheless, there were some serious efforts at understanding the costs involved in
shifting from a forward-stationed presence to a rotational presence. Two of the earliest
such initiatives came up with starkly different answers. A 2007 study commissioned by
EUCOM sought to build a cost comparison between a forward-stationed Stryker brigade
combat team (SBCT) and a rotationally deployed SBCT addressing procurement, operations and maintenance, personnel costs, transportation, garrison operations, medical and
dental costs, military schools, and commissaries and military exchanges.17 This study,
produced by WBB Consulting, attempted to capture all available costs across a 3-year
period. The WBB Consulting study assumed that rotational deployments would last just
6 months, that rotating personnel would be billeted on existing bases, that rotating units
would not deploy with their equipment, and that a new European equipment set would
be purchased for rotating units to fall in on while in Europe. Moreover, the study assumed
that sufficient infrastructure would be maintained under each of the scenarios—hence,
military construction costs were not considered.
In summary, the WBB Consulting study concluded that rotationally deploying a
SBCT would entail an increase of somewhere between $275 million and $502 million over
a 3-year period. This conclusion was based on several factors:

9

•
•
•

•
•
•

I ncreased procurement costs under a rotational deployment scenario of between
$379 million and $569 million, in order to complete the equipment set that rotating
units would use while in Europe.
No difference in operations and maintenance costs.
$79 million more in personnel costs for a forward-stationed unit, due to more
overseas PCS moves and higher overseas housing/subsistence/currency adjustment allowances that were not offset by deployed per diem and family separation
allowances.
$55 to $92 million more in transportation costs for a rotationally deployed unit.
Slightly higher garrison costs for a forward-stationed unit.
Roughly $59 million less in DoD dependent school costs for a rotationally

deployed unit, which were only partially offset by $24 million in U.S. Department of Education support payments to U.S. school districts attended by military
school-age dependents.18

However, an earlier study conducted for the Army by RAND’s Arroyo Center and
published in 2003 concluded that there would be significant net annual savings associated with a posture based on rotational presence.19 This study differed significantly from
the WBB Consulting study insofar as it assumed that the Army would relocate four BCTs
from Germany back to the United States and subsequently rotate that same number of
heavy BCTs to Germany for 6-month deployments.
In sum, RAND Arroyo estimated that relocating four BCTs from Germany would
have entailed an additional $700 million to $830 million in one-time military construction
costs at the receiving U.S. installations. Importantly though, these costs would have been
offset over time through $200 to $350 million in annual savings from:
• Net housing allowance savings, given that allowances for units stationed in Europe
are more generous than for those stationed in the United States;
• Reduced DoD dependent school costs in Europe; and,
• Fewer overseas PCS moves.
For this reason, the study concluded that the “policy [of relying on rotational presence
in Europe] would pay off within 5 years of full implementation.”20 However, a critical
assumption of this study was that unit equipment would not rotate with each deployment. Instead, the authors suggested that equipment sets—estimated at roughly $2.8
billion per BCT21—would need to be pre-positioned in Europe, or some other creative
arrangement arrived at in order to facilitate the rotations. Although the RAND Arroyo
Center factored one-time military construction costs into its 5-year-maximum payoff calculation, it did not include the $2.8 billion one-time equipment costs per BCT—doing so
would have lengthened the payoff period to somewhere between 24 and 44 years.
The Security Environment
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the international security environment had fundamentally changed. The Soviet threat was replaced with a broader range of security
challenges, including terrorism, proliferation, and ethno-religious conflict. Some thought
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that the era of mass military formations located at static main operating bases reflected an
outmoded, industrial-age view of the world characterized by near-peer, state-based security challenges. State-based security threats were still expected to exist, but they would be
joined by three other types of challenges: irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive.22
For this new array of challenges, lighter, smaller formations were viewed as more
capable and appropriate in the 21st century. In the words of one senior Pentagon official
at the time, “We no longer need heavy maneuver forces as the central element of our
defense posture in Europe.”23 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was as categorical in casting
an even broader net: “The 21st century does not call for the permanent deployment of
heavy forces.”24 Others argued plainly that “great powers have little incentive or interest
in expanding further.”25
Usability
Through operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and then Iraq, it became clear to decision-makers in the Pentagon that U.S. forces were conducting an increasing number of operations
beyond their forward-stationed locations. This took on a more problematic character in
the run-up to the Iraq war in early 2003, when U.S. forces forward-stationed in Germany were unable to travel through Austrian airspace in deploying to the Middle East.26
In looking to the future, the DoD assumed that the so-called legacy posture would be
unsuitable for undertaking operations into “near or distant theaters,” and that U.S. forces
could no longer expect to fight in place as they had during the Cold War.27 Perhaps most
importantly, it was argued that forward-stationed forces, especially in Europe, offered
no significant time advantage in terms of getting a military unit to the Persian Gulf, for
example. This was despite the fact that sail time from Bremerhaven, Germany to Kuwait is
actually shorter by about 7 calendar days than sailing from Beaumont, Texas to Kuwait.28
Nonetheless, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld went even further, arguing that restationing U.S. forces from overseas back to the United States would actually increase the
ability of the United States to surge forces forward quickly to conflict zones. In his signature style, he first asked and then answered his own question: “[If we send] more troops
home from theaters in Europe will it weaken our ability to surge quickly to trouble spots?
Actually, the opposite is probably closer to the truth.”29
Host Nation Politics
Some in Washington argued that U.S. allies had grown weary of hosting American military personnel.30 This was especially true with regard to the U.S. Marine Corps
presence in Okinawa, where local residents have complained for years about violence,
noise, and other problems attributed to U.S. service members residing there.31 It also has
increasingly applied to the American military presence at Yongsan in South Korea, where
sprawling Seoul has gradually encroached right up to the garrison’s gates, as seen in
Figure 4. The prime real estate of Yongsan Garrison in densely populated Seoul has long
been eyed by South Korean developers, who were undoubtedly heartened when they
heard then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ask, “If foreign troops were stationed
in New York’s Central Park, would it be acceptable to Americans?”32 Hence, by reducing
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overseas presence of U.S. military forces, Washington would reduce friction with allies
and partner host nations.

Figure 4. Yongsan Garrison in Foreground, with Seoul High-rises in Background.33
Family Readiness
This argument was based on the assumption that Soldiers and their families preferred
to live in the United States instead of overseas in a country like Germany, especially if
those overseas-stationed families had to endure so-called double separations.34 That is,
if forward-stationed Soldiers deployed from their forward locations to the Middle East,
for example, their families back in Germany would be separated not simply from their
deployed military family member but also their extended U.S.-based families. Moreover,
it was assumed that even though Soldiers would deploy for overseas rotations, there
would be fewer permanent changes of station and thus greater stability for families.
Finally, it was argued that spouses of military service members were unable to work in
the local economy due to host-nation restrictions.35
Institutional Imperatives
Another argument in favor of restationing most Army forces back to the United States
was that it facilitated easier force generation for combat operations. In order to have sufficient forces to handle the demands of wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army developed a force generation model—known as the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
model (see Figure 5)—that had active component units ready for deployment once every
3 years. This required rigorous adherence to an A-B-C rotation scheme that consumed
readiness as quickly as it could be built: while Unit A was deployed in combat for a year,
Unit B was conducting individual and collective training for a year to prepare for its
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upcoming rotation following Unit A, and Unit C was resetting and recovering following
its year in combat. At any given time, one-third of units were in a combat deployment,
one-third were in training for a combat deployment, and one-third were returning and
recovering from a combat deployment. Individuals within those units arrived, trained,
deployed, and returned from deployment together. Units forward-stationed in Europe,
however, were and still are comprised of individuals who had moved to Europe under
PCS orders.

Figure 5. The ARFORGEN Cycle.36
These PCS moves occurred roughly every 3 years and did not necessarily coincide
with their respective unit’s place in the ARFORGEN cycle. This complicated the ability
of the Army to employ forward-stationed maneuver units in the same A-B-C rotation
scheme as maneuver units stationed in the United States, because it affected the readiness
of the gaining and losing units in both Europe and the United States.37
This argument was not typically cited publicly, probably because it pertains to the
seemingly esoteric world of force management. When it was mentioned publicly as a
rationale for restationing from overseas back to the United States, the argument was typically couched in terms of permitting greater reach and enabling Washington to better
manage the entire military force on a global basis.38
Another institutional argument was the notion that significant drawdowns of forward presence in Europe were viewed by some within the Army staff and the Pentagon
more broadly as a precondition for another round of base closures in the United States.39
For some years, but especially in the wake of the post-Iraq War and post-sequestration
drawdown in total Army force structure, the Army has been convinced that it has excess
infrastructure in the United States. For this reason, the Army and the DoD have requested
Congress authorize another round of base realignments and closures (BRAC).40 However,
members of Congress are loathe to authorize another BRAC round that would put at risk
military infrastructure in their district or state. For this reason, arguments in favor of a
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stateside BRAC would be stronger if it could be shown that overseas infrastructure—and
with it, forward-stationed forces—had been cut as deeply as possible.
Unit Training Readiness
Most recently, other arguments that have been used to justify rotational deployments
over forward stationing center on unit training readiness. Units that rotationally deploy
with their equipment have to go through the process of packing up all of their equipment at home station, transporting it to the nearest port, shipping it overseas, and then
conducting reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) in theater (See
Figure 6). Advocates of rotational deployment models argue that this effort amounts to
training for precisely what a U.S.-stationed unit would need to do during a security crisis
overseas. Nonetheless, without rotational deployments, so goes the argument, U.S.-stationed units would have fewer opportunities to conduct important expeditionary training activities.

Figure 6. U.S. Army Soldiers from the 662nd Movement Control Team,
25th Transportation Battalion, 501st Sustainment Brigade Observe the Arrival of
M109A6 Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzers via Rail Car at Camp Casey, South Korea,
March 27, 2007.41
Another training readiness argument centers on the notion that rotational deployments expose more of the force to the overseas operating environment. This is certainly
the case today, given that most of the Army is stationed in the United States.
Finally, another unit training readiness argument in favor of rotational deployments
centers on reducing personnel turnover relative to units that are forward-stationed. This
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argument applies in particular to forward-stationed units in Korea, where most tours of
duty last only 1 year. For a forward-stationed maneuver unit in Korea, this meant that
during any given month, 8 percent of that unit’s personnel were permanently changing
station and moving to another assignment in the Army.
Other Arguments
The effort to develop studies or reports, testify before Congress, and otherwise explain
the massive change about to occur in the Army’s posture was designed to build public
and Congressional support for restationing. There, however, are two reasons to think
that restationing would have occurred even in the absence of the public effort. First, with
no members of the House of Representatives or the Senate representing American facilities and units overseas, the U.S. Congress was predisposed toward cuts to forward presence and especially toward relocation of forward-stationed units back to the 50 States.
Especially at a time when the Army was downsizing—following the 2011 Budget Control
Act—most in Congress preferred that those cuts occur overseas, in the hope that this
would permit more units to be maintained in the 50 States. The executive branch at that
time was apparently unwilling or unable to engage in a political fight with members
of Congress over cutting force structure within the 50 States, and the executive branch
instead chose to continue cutting structure from overseas.42
Perhaps more importantly though, it was clear to those intimately involved in the
restationing effort that, especially in the first term of the Bush administration, the plan
to withdraw forces from Europe in particular, but also from the Korean peninsula, had
a momentum of its own, largely thanks to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In the
words of one person with first-hand knowledge of the exchanges between Mr. Rumsfeld
and senior U.S. military commanders in Europe, the Secretary’s goal of withdrawing
forces from Europe “was a done deal before the analysis even started.”43 The IGPBS was
seen as “a lagging indicator, not a leading one.”44 Another observer noted that senior
Office of the Secretary of Defense political appointees were quite clear regarding their
intent to “get the Army out of Europe” as early as 2001, soon after the Bush administration entered office.45
ASSESSING THE SHIFT TO ROTATIONAL PRESENCE
As a result of the implementation—with some modifications—of the 2003 IGPBS,
the U.S. Army has increasingly become largely stationed in the 50 States. Correspondingly, the Army has increased its reliance on rotational presence to achieve deterrence
and assurance effects, especially since 2014, in both Europe and on the Korean peninsula.
This experience over the last couple of years has generated both quantitative and qualitative data that can help form the basis for judgements about the utility of rotational
presence and inform future decisions on U.S. posture overseas in the next decade. Given
the important role U.S. military overseas posture plays for not simply deterrence and
assurance but an array of other national security objectives, it is both appropriate and
necessary to consider whether the shift toward rotational presence has indeed paid off—
literally and figuratively—as expected.
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Fiscal Costs
In the case of Korea, there was no rigorous cost-benefit analysis conducted before the
Army began rotating full brigade combat teams from the United States to the Korean
peninsula in 2015.46 In any case, and based on evidence to date, it appears that relying
on rotational presence on the Korean peninsula is “always more expensive” than forward-stationed presence, given extant infrastructure, cost-sharing arrangements with
the South Korean Government, and use of the Korea Enduring Equipment Set (KEES)
by rotationally deployed units.47 The commander of U.S. Forces Korea, General Vincent Brooks, said much the same in April 2016, when he argued that it was “absolutely”
cheaper to have U.S. forces stationed in South Korea rather than bringing them home.48
Instead, the U.S. Army in Korea was largely driven by the imperative to eliminate the
turnover created by 1-year tours of duty. Prior to 2015, nearly all of the 20,000 U.S. Army
troops on the Korean peninsula were assigned there for 1 year, most without accompanying dependents. One-year assignments meant frequent PCS moves for troops assigned to
Korea, creating a turnover rate of roughly 8 percent per month.49 Shifting to a rotational
presence for a significant number—about 5,200 troops—of the 20,000 on the peninsula
greatly reduces personnel churn and arguably strengthens unit readiness (more on this
below). Nonetheless, no cost analysis preceded or accompanied this decision.50
Unofficial cost analysis on the part of 2nd Infantry Division staff led to the expectation
that overall fiscal costs for a rotationally deployed ABCT would be roughly the same as
for a forward-stationed ABCT, with the exception of spare parts (Class IX, in logistician
parlance).51 However, actual cost data to date would appear to support the views of General Brooks and others mentioned above. Operations tempo (OPTEMPO) costs for rotationally deployed ABCTs in Korea have averaged $47.3 million over 9 months, higher
than average OPTEMPO costs for the previously forward-stationed ABCT of $38.1 million over 9 months.52 Ironically, average M1 tank miles—the number of miles driven by
all tanks in a particular unit over a specific period of time—has been 16 percent lower for
ABCTs rotationally deployed to Korea than for the previously forward-stationed ABCT.53
Elsewhere in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, the U.S. Army has not maintained forward-stationed units in foreign countries beyond South Korea or Japan. In order to increase its
forward presence and improve both expeditionary and decisive action readiness, USARPAC began implementing an initiative known as Pacific Pathways in 2014. This effort
entails deploying a battalion-size task force on a series of back-to-back bilateral or multilateral exercises and other training events across the theater (see Figure 7).54
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Figure 7. U.S. and Malaysian Soldiers Conduct Patrols at Pacific Pathways Exercise.55
Most importantly, Pacific Pathways has been viewed as a means of reducing the costs
of forward presence and engagement. Instead of sending a military unit (or units) back
and forth across the Pacific Ocean for various exercises, a single unit deploys and remains
so for the duration of the sequentially arranged exercises. The former commander of
USARPAC, General Vincent Brooks, argued that Pacific Pathways would be “an efficient
way for us to use the limited resources that we’re going to have.”56 More specifically,
others argued that the Army was creating “efficiencies” by consolidating three or more
previously discrete deployments into a single months-long operation.57
Ironically though, one report found that Pathways events in 2015 cost a total of $34.5
million, roughly $18.1 million more than what the same exercises cost when conducted
individually.58 The reason for this though is clear enough—the 2015 (and subsequent)
events involved participation of much larger force packages. Whether this initiative represents significant cost savings aside, Pathways rotations do not provide for continuous,
heel-to-toe presence in the theater, since rotations last only about 90 days. As such, it has
limited utility for strengthening assurance and deterrence, which are the two major concerns of this study. Nonetheless, the Pathways model could provide a useful, additive
approach in conjunction with forward stationing.
Just as in Korea, there was no detailed cost-benefit analysis conducted in 2014 prior to
the decision to begin conducting rotational deployments from the United States to Poland
and the Baltic States.59 Through most of 2014, the 173rd Airborne BCT, with headquarters in Italy, was tasked with providing presence in each of the Baltic States and Poland.
By September 2014, that mission had shifted to the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.
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For the next 2 years—until January 2017—the presence mission in the Baltic States and
Poland rotated between Europe-stationed units and U.S.-stationed units, with occasional
underlaps.
Repeated efforts to develop cost estimates for those rotations were largely based on
“educated guesswork,” given the lack of past data.60 Even as heel-to-toe rotations of full
BCTs began from the United States to Poland, the Baltic States, and elsewhere in Eastern
Europe in early 2017, the cost estimates have not been as refined as they might have been
(see Figure 8). The reason for this is that the cost model used by the Army—the Force and
Organization Cost Estimating System (FORCES) suite of models—does not allow users
to include unique costs that are not already listed in the model(s).61 This is critical given
the novel nature of what the Army has been doing across all of Eastern Europe, where
conditions and requirement may differ from country to country and even installation to
installation.62

Figure 8. A Live Fire Accuracy Screening Test undertaken by Bradley Fighting
Vehicles of 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division in Swietozow,
Poland, January 16, 2017.63
That said, the FORCES model, the Army Contingency Operations Model, and the
growing amount of past data collected by USAREUR on rotational deployments from the
United States to date can be used to develop a more robust set of cost estimates than has
ever been possible before, in order to better inform future forward presence decisions in
Europe or elsewhere. This study will now turn briefly to providing a cost estimate comparison that might be relied upon, for instance, in trying to determine whether it is more
cost effective fiscally to rotationally deploy an ABCT from Ft. Hood to Europe, or to forward station an ABCT in Europe. An ABCT was chosen for illustrative and comparative
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purposes largely because it is the centerpiece of the heel-to-toe rotations occurring currently in Europe. However, it is very important to note that an ABCT is only one element
of effective and efficient deterrence and assurance in Europe or South Korea. Additionally, different types of Army units are likely to have different recurring costs.
Before attempting to compare costs associated with rotational presence versus forward stationing in Europe, some assumptions regarding recurring costs are in order:
• Each heel-to-toe rotation lasts 9 months. Annual averages are based on the assumption that within 3 years (36 months), 4 rotations can occur. Table 3 (Recurring
Average Annual Fiscal Costs, in millions U.S. dollars [USD]) only includes annual
recurring costs. One-time costs are considered later.
• Rotating units will conduct each rotation with their own equipment.
• Each rotating ABCT will incur predeployment costs to prepare personnel and
equipment at home station lasting roughly 30 days and estimated to cost $17.63
per rotation, or an average of $23.5 million per year.64 This includes obtaining
special clothing, equipment, and other supplies; medical and dental services; theater-specific training; predeployment command, control, and communications;
and miscellaneous deployment-related supplies and contracts.
• HQDA estimates that it costs $38 million to move an ABCT from the United States
to Germany each way, so Table 3 includes an average cost of $101.33 million per
year.65
• Operations and Sustainment costs for a Ft. Hood-stationed ABCT and a Germany-stationed ABCT are based on the FORCES model.66 The figures for Germany
include overseas PCS costs.
• Above and beyond the base Operation and Sustainment costs just mentioned,
there are OPTEMPO costs associated with the exercises and other activities an
ABCT conducts in Eastern Europe. Given costs of $372.1 million per rotation for
an ABCT from Ft. Hood,67 Table 3 includes an average annual cost of $496.1 million, assuming four rotations every 3 years. This includes the costs associated with
a 30-day overlap between deploying and redeploying ABCTs as well as family
separation pay. The $372.1 million per rotation figure comprises the following:68
o Family Separation Pay: $9.5 million;
o Subsistence: $44 million;
o Clothing and other personnel equipment/supplies: $15.6 million;
o Medical support and health services: $9.1 million;
o Training: $2.2 million;
o OPTEMPO (fuel, other petroleum products, parts): $81.4 million;
o Facilities/Base Support: $1.7 million;
o Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I):
$20.6 million;
o Other supplies and miscellaneous contracts: $140.9 million; and
o Second destination transportation costs: $47.1 million.
• Operations and sustainment costs for a forward-stationed unit—to conduct over
the course of a year roughly 75 percent of the exercises and other training events
that rotationally deployed ABCTs conduct in a year—is estimated to be $327.7
million.69
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•

o T
 his figure excludes family separation pay, which rotationally deployed
units receive, but forward-stationed units do not, of roughly $7.9 million
per rotation. This assumes only 75 percent of a 4,200-person U.S.-stationed
ABCT is rotationally deployed, that all deployed personnel have stateside
dependents they are separated from, and that all deployed personnel are
separated for 10 months.
o As noted above, the additional OPTEMPO costs associated with a rotationally deployed unit are $372.1 million per rotation. When the family separation costs are excluded, the cost incurred by a rotational unit over 10
months is $362.6 million, or $36.3 million per month.
o If a forward-stationed ABCT incurs 75 percent of the additional OPTEMPO
costs that a rotationally deployed ABCT would, this yields a cost of $27.2
million per month, or $327.7 million per year.
As implied in the previous sub-bullet, this study assumes if the United States
forward stations an ABCT in Europe west of Poland (for example, in Germany),
Washington will not maintain heel-to-toe ABCT presence across Eastern Europe
as it has since January 2017. This assumption is based on three factors:
o First, regardless of ABCT disposition, the United States already has a heelto-toe presence in Poland through its role in the NATO eFP initiative. Under
eFP, the United States has been rotationally deploying a battalion-sized
unit from its forward-stationed forces in Europe into Poland on a heel-totoe basis.
o Second, the Patriots-to-Poland deployments of several years ago provides
a useful, illustrative example of how Washington has previously employed
satisficing solutions in the context of forward presence. As part of a bilateral defense cooperation agreement signed in 2008 by the United States and
Poland, Washington began rotationally deploying Patriot units to Poland
in 2010. For reasons largely related to operational demands elsewhere, as
well as fiscal cost, U.S. Patriot rotations to Poland did not comprise an entire
battery, did not always carry missiles, and were not integrated into Polish
air defense. Of course Warsaw was dissatisfied with this—Poland preferred
fully manned, fully equipped, integrated units for each rotation—yet Washington was satisfied it had met the requirement of increased familiarization
and training with Poles on air and missile defense.70
o Finally, spreading a rotationally deployed ABCT across Poland and six
other Eastern European countries—which is what the United States is currently doing—prevents it from achieving mass and diminishes its combat
power. Stationing it in a single location allows it to maintain mass for faster
movement to contingencies.
o Alternatively, if Washington decided to maintain heel-to-toe ABCT presence
across Eastern Europe, while also forward stationing an ABCT in Germany,
it is very likely the United States would occasionally need to rotationally
deploy forces from the United States. The recurring costs associated with
both a forward-stationed unit and occasionally rotational deployments
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would obviously be greater than simply maintaining the current rotational
deployments from the 50 States directly into Eastern Europe.
• Beginning in mid-2017, the Army began implementing Army Incentive Pay for
Operational Deployment (AIP-OD) for rotational deployments to Europe, which
will provide $195 per troop per month. AIP-OD is already paid to troops rotationally deployed to Korea, and the Army is implementing AIP-OD in Europe to
bring greater pay parity to rotational deployments that are not tied to contingency
operations. Assuming only 75 percent of a 4,200-person U.S.-stationed ABCT is
rotationally deployed, this will yield a cost of $6.1 million per rotation, or $8.2
million per year on average.
• Adding an ABCT to Germany will raise the school-age population there and could
incur average annual costs of $29.3 million.71 Meanwhile, to support the education
of dependents associated with an ABCT stationed in Ft. Hood, the U.S. Department of Education provides an average of $450 per service member to local school
districts in Impact Aid, according to a RAND study.72 For districts in which more
than 20 percent of the students come from military families, the DoD also provides
Supplemental Impact Aid.73 In the case of Ft. Hood, local school districts like the
Killeen Independent School District and the Copperas Cove Independent School
District both receive DoEd Impact Aid and DoD Supplemental Impact Aid. One
recent study estimated that the relocation of a BCT from Ft. Hood could cost the
districts there between $8.5 and $20 million.74 For the purposes of this study, an
average of $14.25 million in total impact aid funding is assumed.
• One-time military construction at forward operating sites in Poland and elsewhere
in Eastern Europe is not included in Table 3, since it is assumed that such costs are
likely to be incurred regardless of whether a rotating unit or a forward-stationed
unit uses the site(s).
• Mission Command Element costs—that is, the costs associated with maintaining
a division-level command element of some sort between the brigade rotated to
or forward-stationed in Europe and the theater-level Army headquarters (USAREUR)—are not included, since it is assumed that such a mission command element is necessary regardless of whether a brigade is forward-stationed or rotated
from the United States.
• Additional Sustainment Enabler costs—that is, the costs of providing sustainment
to a unit above and beyond what USAREUR is capable of today—are not included,
since it is assumed that additional sustainment enabler units and capabilities will
be required regardless of whether a unit is rotated from the United States or relocated to Germany.75
• Additional Civilian Pay costs—that is, costs included in European Reassurance
Initiative (ERI) budget estimates and related to the increased burden of managing
a rotational force presence—are not included, since it is assumed that additional
civilian capacity will be required regardless of whether a brigade is rotated to
Europe or relocated there.76
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Rotationally Deployed (from
Ft. Hood) ABCT Annual Recurring Average Costs

Forward-Stationed (Germany)
ABCT Annual Recurring Average Costs

Predeployment requirements

23.51

0.00

To/from theater transportation for
rotating personnel and equipment

101.33

0.00

Operations and sustainment, for a
unit based at Ft. Hood

548.40

0.00

Operations and sustainment, for a
unit stationed in Germany

0.00

699.60

496.10

327.70

AIP-OD

8.20

0.00

Impact aid (Rotational) / DoD education activity (ForwardStationed)

14.25

29.30

$1,191.80

$1,056.60

Additional operations and sustainment for activities in Europe
(includes Family Separation Pay
and a 30-day overlap for
Rotational)

SUM

Table 3. Recurring Average Annual Fiscal Costs (in millions USD).
As shown above, the difference in terms of recurring average annual fiscal costs is
roughly $135 million. This is a fairly significant difference, but the actual difference in
recurring annual fiscal costs is probably somewhat greater for two reasons. First, theater
specific requirements in Europe appear to be greater than originally anticipated before
heel-to-toe rotational deployments there began in early 2017. For example, every rotational unit must have its fuel and ammunition carrying equipment certified to operate
in Europe, resulting in costs for parts, labor, and testing that is currently estimated at
$8.5 million per year.77 Forward-stationed units go through this process also, but not as
frequently since their equipment does not rotate in and out of theater every 9 months.
Additionally, upon return to the United States, rotationally deployed equipment must
complete agricultural cleaning, currently estimated at $5 million per rotation, or $6.6 million per year.78 As with the certification requirement, forward-stationed units incur some
of these same costs, but at a far lower rate than a rotationally deployed unit. These costs
are not included in the estimates cited above for transportation to and from the theater.
Second, force structure costs are not included above. Relying on a rotational deployment model for overseas presence requires a larger end strength, or at least a greater
number of combat units, than does an overseas presence model based on forward stationing. If the United States wants to maintain a continuous brigade presence in Poland, for
instance, it could forward station a brigade there. In this hypothetical example, that brigade would train in Poland, its personnel and their families would all live in Poland, and
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when necessary for operations elsewhere the brigade would deploy from and redeploy
to Poland. This requires the Army to maintain a single brigade to achieve that continuous
brigade presence.
However, if it chooses rotational presence at some location—and assuming the Army
wants to maintain a 1:2 ratio of deployment time to home station time—the Army requires
one additional brigade over what it already has in the inventory in order to maintain an
A-B-C rotation scheme.79 According to the Congressional Budget Office, an ABCT costs
$500 million per year to operate, including compensation for its military personnel.80
This would bring the total recurring average annual fiscal costs of rotational presence in
Europe to $1.691 billion.
In addition to the recurring average annual fiscal costs, there are one-time fiscal costs
as well, which are featured in Table 4. As noted previously, to physically relocate an
ABCT from the United States to Europe would cost the Army roughly $128.5 million.81
Relocating an ABCT to Europe would also require additional one-time military construction costs. Since the United States has reduced so much of its force structure in
Europe, it has greatly consolidated its infrastructure footprint as well, returning many
facilities back to host nation authorities. As a result, no single location in the current U.S.
military footprint in Europe has enough capacity to host an entire ABCT without building
some amount of additional infrastructure. Hence, military construction will be necessary.
In one scenario, in which those elements of the 173rd airborne brigade stationed at
Grafenwoehr relocated to Vicenza, Italy, the one-time relocation of the 173rd’s Grafenwoehr-stationed elements plus the one-time military construction costs would add up to
roughly $1.6 billion.82 A more conservative scenario would involve moving Germany-stationed elements of the 173rd as previously suggested as well as moving the 2nd Stryker
Cavalry Regiment from Vilseck to Baumholder—this option would require roughly $50.1
million in military construction and $5.6 million in relocation costs, for a total of $55.7
million in one-time costs.83
Of course locating an ABCT at Grafenwoehr is not the only option. It could be stationed, for instance, in Baumholder, which has an adjacent training area and which is
close to Ramstein Air Base. This option would incur one-time military construction costs
of approximately $166.5 million.84 The ABCT could also be stationed in Northern Germany, in facilities previously used by the British Army of the Rhine. For instance, the
Bergen-Hohne garrison—consisting of several barracks facilities as well as a tank live fire
range—was, until 2015, home to between 4,000 and 5,000 British troops that were part of
the 7th Armoured Brigade (UK). New construction and upgrades to facilities there could
cost as much as $1.5 billion.85
Another option would be to base the ABCT in Poland. According to those familiar
with extant military sites in western Poland, it is likely that a significant amount of military construction would be necessary to provide enough quality housing, barracks, family
support, and other infrastructure for a full ABCT. The total for this might amount to
somewhere between $1-1.2 billion.86 Nonetheless, forward stationing an ABCT in Poland
might be preferable over Germany for several reasons.
First, construction costs are cheaper in Poland. The DoD regularly publishes a list of
area cost factors for use as a guide for the preparation and review of programming and
budget cost estimates for military construction and family housing. These market-based
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cost factors help budget planners to account for local or regional construction cost differentials. For example, it is more expensive to build in California, where the cost factor is
1.24, than it is to build in Louisiana, where the cost factor is 0.87. In Europe, the cost factor
in Grafenwoehr, Germany is 1.17, while the cost factor in Poland is 0.95.87
Second, given Poland’s strong desire for larger scale permanent U.S. military presence,88 it seems clear the Polish Government may be interested in direct cost sharing,
especially given the cost-sharing arrangements reached to date on forward operating
sites in Poland.89 A robust, direct cost-sharing agreement, similar to the kind of agreement the United States has with South Korea, could theoretically cut one-time military
construction costs in half. Poland’s defense budget for 2017 is roughly $9.6 billion, and it
currently spends just over 5 percent—or about $496 million—per year on infrastructure.90
To date, the Polish have shown themselves willing to cost-share in the development of
joint use forward operating sites that will be used by rotationally deployed U.S. forces.
Assuming joint use of some facilities, as appropriate, it seems clear Poland would be willing to cost-share for the development of infrastructure for forward-stationed U.S. forces.
Finally, stationing an ABCT in Poland positions it closer to the likely threat, making
it more able to quickly respond to any catastrophic security event in the Baltics, while
still keeping it as deployable by sea, rail, and air for worldwide contingencies as would
be the case from Germany. Similarly, stationing an ABCT in Poland keeps it closer to the
countries—especially the Baltic States and of course Poland—with which it would likely
spend most of its time training (see Figure 9). Stationing the ABCT in Poland would
clearly require careful diplomacy both among American allies in Western Europe, some
of which might consider the move a violation of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act,
and vis-à-vis Moscow, which would certainly characterize the move as offensive and
destabilizing.

Figure 9. Map of Kaliningrad and Baltic Sea Region.91
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Rotationally
Deployed
(from Ft. Hood)
ABCT

Forwardstationed
(Grafenwoehr #1)
ABCT

Forwardstationed
(Grafenwoehr #2)
ABCT

Forwardstationed
(Baumholder)
ABCT

Forwardstationed
(Northern GE)
ABCT

Forwardstationed
(Poland)
ABCT

With regard to the concerns of allies, it is important to remember that the Founding
Act is a political agreement, not a legally binding treaty. Political agreements are subject
to evolving interpretation. Moreover, given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation
of Crimea, it is difficult to argue that Russia has held up its part of the Founding Act to
“exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.”92 Regarding
Moscow’s concerns, it is similarly difficult to argue that a 4,200-strong ABCT is destabilizing in the face of the arsenal Russia has already built in Kaliningrad, including S-400
air defense systems, Iskander-M short-range nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles, Buyan-class corvettes armed with nuclear-capable Kalibr cruise missiles, the Bal
land-based anti-ship missile system, the Bastion mobile anti-ship defense system, Sukhoi
Su-30SM “Flanker” combat aircraft, and tens of thousands of troops.93

Relocation of ABCT to
Europe

0

128.5

128.5

128.5

128.5

128.5

Relocation of 173rd units;
military construction
(MILCON) in
Grafenwoehr

0

1,600

0

0

0

0

Relocation of 173rd and
2nd Stryker Cavalry
Regiment units; MILCON in Grafenwoehr

0

0

55.7

0

0

0

MILCON in Baumholder

0

0

0

166.5

0

0

MILCON in NE
Germany

0

0

0

0

1,500

0

MILCON in Poland, with
cost-sharing

0

0

0

0

0

550

$0.0

$1,728.5

$184.2

$295.0

$1,628.5

$678.5

SUM

Table 4. One-Time Fiscal Costs (in millions USD).
The one-time cost difference between rotational presence and forward stationing is
fairly significant, regardless of the option chosen for forward stationing. However, there
is one significant mitigating factor. It was argued previously that any cost estimation
includes the recurring cost of additional force structure to achieve an A-B-C rotation
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scheme. In addition to the annual costs of maintaining an additional ABCT in the inventory, it therefore also makes sense to include the one-time costs associated with equipping that ABCT, which could be as high as $2.8 billion.94 Hence, the difference in one-time
costs among the various options above ought to be considered less than what is shown.
If the recurring and one-time additional force structure costs are excluded, the
breakeven point—that is, the number of years before the recurring savings from forward
stationing featured on Table 3 would pay-off the one-time costs of relocation and/or military construction featured on Table 4—ranges from about 1.5 to as many as 13 years, as
shown in Table 5.

Pay-off
Period
(in years)

Station
ABCT in
Grafenwoehr;
Relocate 173rd
units

Station ABCT in
Grafenwoehr;
Relocate 173rd
and 2nd Stryker
Cavalry
Regiment units

Station ABCT
in Baumholder

Station
ABCT in
Northern
Germany

Station ABCT
in
Poland (with
cost-sharing)

12.8

1.4

2.2

12.8

5.3

Table 5. Breakeven Point for Forward Stationing (in years).

Unit Training Readiness
Fiscal costs should not and cannot be the sole basis upon which choices between rotational deployments and forward stationing—or something in between—are made. Unit
training readiness—and questions of whether and how forward presence builds, maintains, or consumes it—is a critical factor to consider as well.
In the case of Korea, it seems clear based on numerous research discussions with the
commanders of units that have conducted rotations there as well as leaders and staff of
8th Army and 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea that rotational deployments provide for increased unit readiness in a decisive action training context, more so than forward-stationed units. As discussed above, immediately before a rotational deployment
to South Korea, the designated brigade combat team completes a collective training rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin, California. The deploying units
are, therefore, typically at the peak of training readiness.
Moreover, because these units maintain a high OPTEMPO during their rotational
deployments—that is, they are nearly constantly engaged in training and exercises for
9 months—unit readiness is typically maintained throughout the deployment.95 This is
especially appealing to some senior U.S. commanders on the ground in both Korea, as
26

noted above, as well as in Europe, who contend that the higher level of activity in theater
bolsters assurance and deterrence.96
However, the readiness benefits associated with rotationally deployed forces are partially offset by the level of unit manning, which for rotationally deployed units can be as
low as 67 percent. Ultimately, this yields somewhat reduced combat power for rotational
deployments. During each rotation, brigade commanders must leave behind at home
station in the United States a small rear detachment to handle maintenance of left-behind
equipment and other administrative or technical tasks. In contrast, forward-stationed
units such as 2SCR and the 173rd are typically manned at 95 percent, in accordance with
Army guidance.97
Even though forward-stationed units in Korea were near fully manned, U.S. commanders in South Korea had to manage two unique challenges. First, under the forward
stationing model, a large proportion of Soldiers sent to Korea were relatively junior.
Second, forward-stationed units in Korea regularly suffered from an average of 8 percent
turnover in personnel every month, given that most military assignments there lasted no
longer than 1 year, without accompanying dependents.98 As troops moved at the completion of their 1-year tours, this created personnel churn that reduced unit readiness by
breaking up crews and small teams.
At present, rotational presence both provides more seasoned personnel and appears
to alleviate personnel turnover, helping to maintain higher levels of readiness throughout the deployment. However, in the absence of a declared emergency, neither DoD
policy nor U.S. law permit the Army to halt all personnel-related moves. This means that
rotationally deployed units remain subject to normal personnel turbulence just as are
forward-stationed units.99 Over time, this could undercut one of the primary arguments
in favor of rotational deployments to South Korea—namely, that such rotations end
personnel churn.
In order to prepare for the specific context of working in South Korea for 9 months,
units about to deploy there undergo a period of learning local customs, regulations, and
norms. The unit’s integration in South Korea is further facilitated somewhat by overlap
in rotations—for instance, units that are rotating into South Korea typically have a period
of overlap with the outgoing unit lasting 10 working days.100
Nonetheless, upon their arrival in South Korea, rotationally deployed units do not
necessarily know as much about the culture, the terrain, the political context, and the idiosyncrasies of counterpart South Korean units and personnel. A learning curve inevitably
ensues, which is quickly complicated after the transfer of authority from the redeploying
unit—there simply are not as many experienced hands around to answer key questions
or point out pitfalls. Even though forward-stationed units saw 8 percent monthly personnel turnover, institutional memory was stronger.101
The same situation applies in Europe where rotationally deployed units arrive with
only limited cultural, institutional, and political insight, relative to their forward-stationed
counterparts. Arguably, the contrast between rotationally deployed troops in Europe
and those forward-stationed on the continent is even more substantial than that between
rotationally deployed troops in Korea and those forward-stationed on the Korean peninsula, given the difference in overseas tour length between Korea and Europe. Forwardstationed forces in Korea are typically on 1-year tours. Meanwhile, in the case of Europe,
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forward-stationed troops typically are there for 3 years, enabling them to have a significantly longer period of exposure to foreign culture, counterpart units, allied procedures,
and so forth, relative to the rotationally deployed troops who are on the ground for 9 to
10 months. Indeed, by the time that rotationally deployed troops in Europe begin to overcome the learning curve, it is time to redeploy home.
In both theaters, this problem is potentially more significant for units that require
greater in-depth knowledge of local customs, rules, regulations, terrain, and counterparts.
For instance, the kinds of training, exercises, and other deterrence and assurance-related
activities conducted by a combat aviation brigade or an air defense artillery unit arguably
require a more detailed knowledge of local, regional, and national rules, regulations, airspace, terrain, and counterpart units than those necessary for standard ground maneuver
brigade combat teams.102 Certainly all types of Army units can gain benefit from greater
in-depth knowledge of their training or operating environment, but this appears acutely
so for specific kinds of units.
On the other hand, for units that rotationally deploy to Europe with their own equipment, there are benefits to be gained from going through the process of packing all of that
equipment up at home station, transporting it to a port in the United States, shipping it
across the ocean, receiving it a port in Germany or Poland, and then conducting onward
movement to a forward operating location (see Figure 10).103 This is precisely the kind of
training stateside units need to prepare them for a crisis.104

Figure 10. Soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division in Fort Carson, Colorado, Offload
an M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle from the Green Ridge Ship during the Reception,
Staging, and Onward Movement Phase of Exercise Saber Strike.105
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The Pacific Pathways initiative mentioned above offers this same kind of deployment
skills training and is cited as a major benefit in terms of building readiness. In particular, Pathways training rotations stress enablers in a way that was never possible under
the previous exercise model used by USARPAC.106 For instance, the Defense Logistics
Agency goes through all the motions of an actual operation, shipping equipment and
supplies that they did not previously do under legacy exercise programs and mimicking
how the DoD would conduct operations in the event of a crisis or a disaster response.
Similarly, officials in the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade reported that the speed, efficiency, and safety of their port operations improved because of Pathways.107
With regard to heel-to-toe presence in Korea, though, similar readiness benefits do
not accrue to units that rotationally deploy there, since they fall in on the pre-positioned
KEES and do not bring their own equipment across the Pacific for their 9-month deployment on the Peninsula.108 In Europe, forward-stationed units achieve similar RSOI training experience when they perform nearly the same tasks as a unit rotationally deploying
from the United States in preparation for an exercise away from their home station. For
instance, Germany-stationed units must pack up their equipment and transport it to exercise locations in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
An important element of readiness—which the Army is gradually coming to appreciate—is the degree to which U.S. and allied troops and units are interoperable. Over the
last 15 to 20 years, it has become commonplace for U.S. national security, defense, and
military strategies to state that the United States prefers to fight in coalitions whenever
possible, and in practice this is precisely what the United States has done (see Figure 11).
For these reasons, interoperability is a vital component of overall readiness. As noted
in the previous section, some argue that by using a rotational deployment model, it is
possible to expose more U.S. forces to operating in Europe and South Korea.109 However,
the problem of insufficient exposure of U.S. forces to operating with allies in Europe
and South Korea would likely not exist if the Army had more of its force structure
forward-stationed.

Figure 11. U.S. and Lithuanian Troops Work Together During
an Exercise in October 2014.110
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A generation or two ago, it was commonplace for Army troops to have at least one
overseas tour in Europe or South Korea early in their military careers. Today, this has
become increasingly rare, creating a problem the Army must solve through other means,
including rotational deployments. However, exposure does not necessarily build or maintain interoperability necessary for high intensity operations, nuanced gray zone conflict,
or plug-and-play unit integration. More specifically, there is more to allied interoperability than simply knowing how to “speak NATO,” although familiarity with NATO terms,
procedures, norms, and operations is obviously critical for a successful deployment to
Europe. Anecdotal evidence—including the experience of seasoned Army leaders—indicates that there are practical, positive implications associated with forward stationing
and the regular interaction it affords with the units, military personnel, and civilians of
U.S. allies.111 For instance, there is evidence to suggest that forward-stationed personnel
operate more effectively on Europe road networks, because they live and work there.112
Aside from the anecdotal, what little scholarly research that exists on this subject indicates that the development and sustainment of personal and unit relationships through
permanent forward stationing enables smoother integration during complex combat
operations against hybrid threats.113
Despite the high readiness levels that rotational forces arrive overseas with and the
high OPTEMPO they maintain while deployed overseas, some senior U.S. military commanders stationed in Korea and Europe appear to more often prefer forward-stationed
forces over rotational forces.114 In the words of one, “All things considered, permanent
forward presence is always preferable to rotational.”115 Another argues, “forward-stationed forces are . . . best,” and that a heel-to-toe rotational presence is “the next best
thing.”116 The former top American officer in Europe, General Phil Breedlove, was even
more explicit, arguing, “There is simply no substitute for our forward force presence in
Europe.”117 On another occasion, he characterized rotational presence as a “second best,”
relative to forward stationing.118
Political-Military Considerations
For the most part, forward-stationed forces bring greater political-military benefits
(see Figure 12) than rotationally deployed forces for at least four reasons. First, more frequent turnover of personnel and units, as exists under a rotational deployment model,
yields less familiarity with host nation civilian and military officials as well as local customs and regulations.119 Military diplomacy vis-à-vis the host nation therefore becomes
more difficult and time consuming. Of course just like forward-stationed units, rotationally deployed units interact with host nation political officials and military counterparts,
but as American officials experienced in combat during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
a familiar lifecycle emerges during a rotational deployment.120 Just as the hard won relationships with host nation officials are solidifying, the rotation ends, and the brigade
commander and his entire leadership team are sent stateside.121
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Figure 12. Frau Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, Germany’s Minister of Defense, meets
with Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, Commander of USAREUR, at Clay Kaserne in
Wiesbaden, August 10, 2016.122
Indeed some argue explicitly that short-term rotations allow military personnel just
enough time to learn the politics of the region they are operating in, but not enough
time to influence it.123 Limiting the time of leaders—who are attempting to develop relationships and knowledge necessary to function at not simply the tactical level but also
the operational and perhaps the strategic—is especially unhelpful to broader U.S. political-military efforts. It ultimately ensures military leaders never have more than a superficial understanding of the situation on the ground.
Second, forward-stationed troops bring an asset to bear that rotationally deployed
forces cannot under almost any circumstances—their dependents. Families that travel
with their service members overseas essentially become unofficial American ambassadors.124 With 60 percent of forward-stationed Soldiers in Europe living off-post, dependents become engaged locally, forging bonds with host nation personnel that contribute
to the strengthening of strategic interoperability between the United States and allied
countries.125
Third, host nation officials associate a more enduring commitment with forward-stationed forces.126 For instance, a senior political appointee in the Polish defense ministry
explained that forward-stationed presence was preferable because of the U.S. commitment it represented.127 Alternatively, the shift toward rotational presence on the Korean
peninsula—along with other steps such as moving the U.S. military footprint south of
Seoul—has caused unease within some parts of the South Korean Government over the
American commitment.128
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Host nations are also aware of the manner in which the United States funds its rotational deployments. At present, rotational deployments to Europe are funded through
overseas contingency operations budgets, not the Army’s base budget.129 This tends to
characterize rotational deployments as temporary contingencies, or operations that could
be shut off relatively quickly and easily. Forward-stationed units are funded in base
budgets, signaling to friends and adversaries alike a stronger degree of constancy in the
American commitment to allied defense.
Fourth, forward-stationed forces and their families bring material benefits to the host
nation that promote economic growth and help to mitigate any negative externalities of
a nearby U.S. military presence. Off-post purchases and the infusion of American dollars
into local communities generate goodwill through increased host nation commerce and
jobs. At the same time, those material benefits help to balance out the downsides of hosting U.S. military units at the local level, such as increased noise.130
Soldier and Family Readiness
As the Army has long known—thanks in part to its forward presence in the former
West Germany during the Cold War—it can be stressful for families and other dependents to live so close to the border of an adversary state poised to unleash significant
destructive military power with little warning. That same stress continues to exist to this
day—as it has for decades—on the Korean Peninsula, where even the youngest dependents of U.S. service members are issued gas masks and participate in noncombatant
evacuation exercises twice per year.
Nevertheless, there is strong anecdotal evidence to suggest that the shift from forward
stationing to an Army that fulfills deterrence and reassurance missions through 9-month
rotational deployments is having a detrimental effect on morale and family readiness.
When Soldiers deploy to combat, as many in the Army did multiple times during the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they typically justify the time away from family for reasons both moral—their country needs them in a time of war—and material—they receive
combat pay, tax benefits, prestige, and other incentives. In the case of deterrence/reassurance rotational deployments to Europe and Korea, neither the moral nor many of the
material justifications apply in the same way.
In a recent sensing session with officers and mid-level noncommissioned officers of
a unit that was about to begin a rotational deployment overseas, it was clear that many
in that unit did not feel that the sacrifice that they were about to endure—particularly in
terms of time away from family—was worthwhile.131 These service members were particularly concerned with how the Army was failing to justify to the force the necessity
of regular, 9-month deployments away from home, especially given the absence of the
moral and material incentives mentioned above.
It is possible that peacetime rotational deployments to Europe and Korea inoculate
family members against the shock of having their service member deployed during a
national security crisis, that the ubiquity of the internet makes months’ long absences tolerable, and that many Soldiers enjoy the chance to temporarily leave the confines of their
stateside military facility and see some of the world on a rotational deployment.132 However, these potentially positive aspects of rotational deployments do not appear to be
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outweighing the downsides. For example, one commander spoke of his unit “consuming
family readiness” through rotational deployments, citing anecdotal evidence of spouse
complaints regarding service member deployments, and difficulty in fulfilling reenlistment goals.133 Others have cited anecdotal evidence of lower morale, higher incidence
of discipline issues, increased divorce rates, junior officers in particular deciding not to
remain in uniform, and families and Soldiers dissatisfied with the pressures of routine
peacetime rotational deployments.134
Within the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, G1—the personnel directorate of the Army—
senior reenlistment counselors are beginning to acknowledge that overseas rotations to
Korea and Europe may have a negative impact on first-term reenlistments in particular.135 In the view of the reenlistment counselors, it may be difficult for the Army to convince young Soldiers to endure many of the hardships associated with a deployment to
combat—for example, at least 10 months separation from family, when the NTC/ Joint
Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation is included, and a very high OPTEMPO while
deployed—without many of the same benefits such as combat pay or the prestige of earning a combat patch.
Perhaps most worrisomely, this anecdotal evidence appears increasingly supported
by available monthly reenlistment data. Using reenlistment data obtained from the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff, G1, it is possible to examine monthly reenlistment rates for the 12
months following a unit’s rotational deployment. According to G1 staff, it is important
to look at a full 12-month period following a rotation, since the first quarter of any FY
tends to have higher enlistment rates while the fourth quarter of any FY tends to have the
lowest enlistment rates.136 Examining a 12-month period following a rotational deployment eliminates seasonality.
For the 12 month period following the respective completion of 4 separate unit rotations—1/1 Cavalry Division to Europe in late 2014; 2/1 Cavalry Division to Korea from
July 2015 to February 2016; 1/3 Infantry Division to Europe in mid-2015; and 1/3 Infantry Division to Europe in late 2015—monthly reenlistment rates were lower in 3 out of
4 instances compared to the monthly reenlistment rates for all Army BCTs, as seen in
Table 6.137 The evidence of potentially reduced morale and reenlistments for rotationally
deployed units is even starker when compared to forward-stationed units such as the
2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, as seen in Table 7.138

Unit Reenlistment Rate (for All Army BCTs Reenlistment
Difference in
12 months after deployment)
Rate (for same 12 months)
Percentage Terms
Rotational Unit A

9.52%

9.21%

+3.4%

Rotational Unit B

8.85%

9.20%

-3.9%

Rotational Unit C

8.20%

9.34%

-12.2%

Rotational Unit D

8.31%

9.24%

-10.1%

Table 6. Comparative Reenlistment Rates for Rotational Units and All Army BCTs.
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Rotational Unit Reenlistment
Rate (for 12 months after
deployment)

2nd Stryker Cavalry
Regiment Reenlistment
Rate (for same 12 months)

Difference in
Percentage Terms

Rotational Unit A

9.52%

10.84%

-12.23%

Rotational Unit B

8.85%

13.52%

-34.57%

Rotational Unit C

8.20%

13.02%

-37.04%

Rotational Unit D

8.31%

12.68%

-34.47%

Table 7. Comparative Reenlistment Rates for Rotational Units and a
Forward-Stationed Unit.
It is important to note that this evidence does not necessarily point to a causal linkage
between rotational deployments and lower monthly reenlistment rates. At a minimum
though, it is certainly plausible to argue that there is an emerging correlation between
rotational deployments and lower reenlistment rates.139
The Army is trying to address the pay differences between rotational deployments to
Korea and to Europe through, for example, the AIP-OD initiative mentioned previously.
This should bring greater parity to the pay received by troops deploying to Europe,
although those deploying to Korea will likely still receive slightly more. Additionally,
troops on rotational deployment to either location will still not receive imminent danger
pay, the sum of what troops get for contingency operations, or tax-free pay.
WHAT MIGHT THE ARMY LEARN FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHERS?
The United States is not the only Western military or even the only U.S. service branch
currently trying to manage the costs associated with rotational forward presence on land.
During its Warsaw Summit in 2016, the NATO alliance announced it would begin sending four battlegroups on a rotational basis to the Baltic States and Poland. These four
battlegroups are each led by a framework ally—the United Kingdom will lead the battlegroup in Estonia, Canada in Latvia, Germany in Lithuania, and the United States in
Poland. As the allies begin to implement this eFP, there are opportunities for the United
States to learn how other countries are handling the challenges—fiscal and otherwise—of
continuous rotational forward presence.
Meanwhile, for several years the U.S. Marine Corps has conducted rotational deployments to Darwin, Australia. Beginning with just a few hundred Marines, the short deployments there have gradually increased, as have the array of lessons learned as the Marine
Corps fulfills a key part of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.
NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP)
In spring 2017, allied battle groups—essentially battalion task forces numbering
around 1,000 troops each—began rotational deployments to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
and Poland (see Figure 13). Framework nations for each battlegroup include the United
Kingdom in Estonia, Canada in Latvia, Germany in Lithuania, and the United States in
Poland. Although the lead nations provide at least the plurality of troops as well as command and control for each battlegroup, a number of allies are also contributing forces:
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•
•
•
•

 or the Canadian-led battlegroup in Latvia, Albania, Italy, Poland, Slovenia, and
F
Spain are also contributing forces;
Denmark and France are contributing to the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia;
The U.S.-led battlegroup includes Romania and the United Kingdom; and,
Belgium, Croatia, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway will participate in the German-led battlegroup in Lithuania.

Figure 13. U.S.-led Battlegroup, Part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence
Initiative, Welcomed in Piotrków Trybunalski, Poland in March 2017.140
In the case of Germany’s battlegroup to be stationed in Lithuania, the Bundeswehr units
rotating into Lithuania will do so with their own unit equipment for each rotation, even
though they are all likely to be mechanized infantry units. Rotations will be 6 months in
duration. When it comes to infrastructure, the Lithuanian Government is paying for construction and upgrades of infrastructure above ground, while the German Government
is paying for below-ground level construction such as utility lines.141 In some limited
circumstances, both Germany and other countries contributing forces to the German-led
battlegroup will fund the specialization of facilities in Lithuania that are necessary to
support specific equipment brought by the sending states to Lithuania. In sum, Germany
will spend just €20 million (euros) on infrastructure in Lithuania in 2017.142
In the case of the UK-led battlegroup in Estonia, the host nation is paying for all infrastructure costs of the British, French, and Danish forces that will be rotationally based
there. Moreover, the Estonians are picking up all recurring support costs, while the
sending states will only pay for the transportation and operations of their own forces.
In the view of one UK official involved in the negotiations, “the Estonians were very
motivated.”143
Regarding the battlegroup in Latvia, the Canadian military is sending both a battalion
headquarters staff as well as two companies worth of troops, for a total of roughly 445
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personnel. The companies will periodically rotate, but the battalion headquarters staff
will be forward-stationed, with accompanying dependents.
Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D)
The Army might also look to the MRF-D, an example of which is depicted in Figure
14. Since 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps has rotated units of various sizes for several months
at a time to Darwin, Australia. Based at Robertson Barracks and Royal Australian Air
Force Base Darwin, the MRF-D comprises a Marine Air-Ground Task Force including
ground, aviation, and logistics elements. Ultimately, the rotational presence there could
number as high as 2,500 Marines. Although not a heel-to-toe rotation—Marines are typically in Darwin only from April to October each year, usually as part of a longer, 9-month
rotation to Guam—the deployment may provide some lessons learned for the Army.

Figure 14. Australian Army Troops and U.S. Marines Conduct Training Together in
the Northern Territory, Australia.144
The Marines keep all the necessary equipment for MRF-D forward, in Australia,
instead of rotating it in and out with each new deployment. This helps to keep transportation costs low, but this savings is offset by higher maintenance costs. MRF-D lacks
intermediate-level maintenance capability in Australia, so equipment in need of any significant maintenance must be shipped elsewhere, often at great expense.
Given the unique training facilities in Darwin, MRF-D ground units typically develop
increased readiness levels as a result of their training in Australia. In contrast, aviation
units typically see readiness levels fall when they rotate to Darwin.145
Australia has committed approximately $11 million in both life support and operational facilities construction and upgrades since 2013.146 However, through at least six
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rounds of negotiations, the Marine Corps has continued to seek additional funding from
Australia in order to increase the size of the annual rotations. Until that occurs, the rotations are unlikely to grow to their full potential of 2,500 Marines.147
When it comes to political-military implications, the Marine Corps is particularly keen
to ensure that MRF-D fulfills its assurance goals with regard to Australia, one of America’s
closest allies, even as drawn out negotiations over cost-sharing limit the size of MRF-D
rotations. Over the last several years, as Chinese claims to sovereignty over practically
all of the South China Sea have become more threatening to countries in the region, this
assurance objective, and with it the role of MRF-D, has taken on increased salience.148 Of
course, Marine Corps leadership realizes this would be more effective in achieving assurance if families were forward also. The leadership is convinced that forward stationing
with families, in contrast to the rotational presence of Marines alone, signals even greater
assurance to allies and commitment on the part of the United States.149
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Comparing Expectations with Reality
In light of data and other evidence from actual rotations to Europe and South Korea,
the original arguments in favor of rotational presence do not appear especially valid,
undermining the case made in 2003-2004 and again in 2010-2011 that the Army could
achieve key objectives such as deterrence and assurance more effectively and efficiently
through increased reliance on rotational presence. With regard to fiscal costs, there is
strong evidence to support the conclusion that in both the case of Europe and the case of
Korea, the DoD is spending more than was originally anticipated, even in the absence of
formal cost-benefit analyses. Rotational presence is more expensive than forward stationing, at least when the units in question are armored units taking their own equipment
on each rotation and when excluding investments already made in extant infrastructure.
This conclusion very likely also applies to other equipment-intensive units such as combat
aviation brigades or air defense units. Moreover, if the recurring and one-time costs of
additional Army force structure necessary to achieve continuous heel-to-toe presence is
included, then it is quite clear that rotational forward presence costs more than forward
stationing even when military construction is factored in.
Given higher-than-expected costs for rotational presence, this study engaged in an
illustrative cost comparison exercise that indicates a return to forward stationing of an
ABCT in Europe is feasible and reasonable from a fiscal cost perspective. The study
showed that, given the military construction requirements necessary to forward station
an ABCT in Europe, there are potentially short breakeven points depending on the alternative stationing scenario selected. An ABCT was selected for comparison because it is
the type of unit currently rotated on a heel-to-toe basis and because it would most likely
have an impact on deterrence and assurance—nonetheless, to achieve effective and efficient deterrence and assurance, other kinds of units, such as combat aviation, are necessary. In any case, it is very likely that other types of units that are equipment-intensive
and that have equipment that is difficult to transport easily—such as combat aviation
units—would have a similar comparative cost result as that shown for the ABCT.
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In terms of diplomatic or political-military factors, it is clear that forward stationing is preferred by American allies overseas. Allies perceive forward-stationed forces
as a sign of a stronger, more enduring commitment from the United States. The United
States goes through no small effort to move and support a military service member and
his/her family overseas—allies recognize this and have a clear preference for forward
stationing over rotational presence. For their part, American military families act as de
facto U.S. ambassadors, engaging with host nation neighbors, businesses, and others in
a way that is not possible with rotational deployments. This contributes significantly to
not just assurance but also to what has been termed strategic interoperability, building
understanding and contributing to common perceptions of the world among the United
States and its closest allies.
There are certainly exceptions to the notion that an American military presence is
beloved around the world—the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa is the most obvious,
but the Army has long managed noise complaints in locations such as Illesheim and
Katterbach, Germany. However, it is also clear that overall, at local, regional, and central
government levels, U.S. forward stationing is preferred by foreign officials and foreign
citizens as a sign of enduring commitment. Indeed, the material benefits that come with
forward stationing often mitigate the downsides associated with an American military
presence, such as increased noise levels. American allies will accept a rotational presence
if it is the only option available, but most evidence points to the conclusion that they
prefer the constancy of forward stationing.
From a family readiness perspective, there is strong anecdotal evidence indicating
both families and Soldiers are dissatisfied with the shift to a U.S.-stationed force. Soldiers
and families feel as if they are being asked to take on many of the same hardships as for a
wartime rotation, but without the moral and material rewards of a combat tour. A 30-day
training rotation at the NTC, plus over 9 months of boots on the ground while on the rotational deployment to Europe or South Korea amounts to nearly a year away from home.
This strong anecdotal evidence on worsened morale appears to be reflected in lower
reenlistment rates for rotationally deployed units during the year following their rotations to Europe or South Korea. In 3 of 4 cases examined, reenlistment rates for rotationally deployed units were lower than for all Army BCTs during the same 12-month
period. Reenlistment rates for the forward-stationed 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment were
higher—in some cases significantly higher—than for rotationally deployed units in the
same 12-month timeframes.
In terms of unit training readiness, it seems clear that rotationally deployed units
arrive in theater at a higher level of readiness for decisive action, and their very high
OPTEMPO allows them to maintain that level of readiness throughout the 9-month
deployment. Whether this really matters for the purposes of deterrence and assurance is
unclear at best. Arguably, it is unlikely that America’s adversaries or its allies recognize
or care about the differences between an active duty ABCT that has just spent 30 days at
NTC and one that has instead maintained readiness through training at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany or the Rodriguez Live Fire Range in Korea.
Moreover, the training readiness advantages of a rotationally deployed unit are balanced out by the significantly higher manning rates of forward-stationed units and the
fact that forward-stationed units typically are more knowledgeable of foreign culture,
38

military units, geography, political leaders, and military counterparts. Forward stationing yields more interoperable, culturally proficient forces. This results in benefits both
vital—such as easier coordination and problem solving during times of crisis, according
to available academic studies on interoperability—and mundane—such as fewer traffic
violations thanks to familiarity with local laws and practices. Rotationally deployed units
can achieve similar levels of interoperability and cultural fluency, but that knowledge
base dissipates after 9 months, and a new commander with new troops must start over
again.
Finally, despite the higher decisive action training readiness seen with regard to
rotationally deployed units, in recent years some senior U.S. military commanders on
the ground in Korea and Europe have expressed their preference for forward-stationed
forces, publicly and privately. In some instances, some senior U.S. military commanders
have expressed a preference for certain types of rotational forces in order to maintain an
extremely high OPTEMPO or to reduce personnel churn.
Given the differing costs and benefits of forward stationing and rotational presence,
it is clear that there is not a single answer that is applicable to all theaters at all times. In
other words, when it comes to forward stationing or rotational presence, one size does
not fit all. In fact, the right answer for a given theater may not be one model or the other,
but rather a combination of both rotational presence and forward stationing, in order to
maximize political-military influence, reduce fiscal costs to sustainable levels, leverage
cost-sharing where possible and appropriate, minimize reduced morale associated with
long rotational deployments, and ensure adequate equipment readiness, manning levels,
and training readiness.
To some degree, this is what appears to be the case today in both Europe and South
Korea, where rotational deployments augment the deterrence and assurance provided by
forward-stationed units. However, this interpretation is only partially accurate—while it
is true that rotational deployments are being used to supplement forward stationing, it is
also true that there is insufficient balance in the Army’s overseas presence model today.
The pendulum has swung too far in the direction of a U.S.-stationed Army, yielding—
necessitating even—an over-reliance on rotational deployments for continuous heel-totoe presence to achieve deterrence and assurance.
On the one hand, the Army appears to have recognized this and has begun to earmark additional force structure for forward stationing in Europe, as part of an increase
in end strength authorized by the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).150
Although on the other hand, as this study went to press, the Army was still planning on
further reductions of extant forward-stationed units in Europe.151 As the Army attempts
to find balance in its approach to forward presence, much of the evidence as presented
in this study points to the conclusion that the Army can more effectively and efficiently
deter and assure through an increase in forward stationing, beyond that which exists
today.
How Should the Army Increase Forward Stationing?
Clearly, increasing forward stationing requires delicate negotiation with potential
host nations. Additionally, though, there is a domestic political dynamic that requires
39

equal attention and careful shepherding. Congress has only rarely embraced forward
stationing of U.S. forces. In fact, history shows that since the Vietnam era, Congress has
typically been ambivalent at best or occasionally opposed to forward stationing.152 Most
members of Congress—but certainly not all—view forward stationing from a fairly parochial perspective, reasoning that they would rather see U.S. troops and families, and the
additional spending those families bring, in their States or districts, vice overseas. For
this reason, if the Army is to increase its presence overseas through forward stationing,
it will be in a much stronger position vis-à-vis Congress if it does so through growth in
end strength rather than through relocating a unit that is already stationed in the United
States.
That said, decades of historical evidence point to one central conclusion regarding
executive-legislative relations when it comes to overseas stationing strategy and policy.
That is, when the executive branch leads forcefully on these issues, it nearly always overcomes Congressional resistance, even when relocating an extant unit from a U.S. facility
to an overseas location.153 Today, if the executive branch—led by the White House but
reinforced with a clear consensus among the key national security agencies and departments—employs its considerable implicit and explicit authority in national security
affairs and makes a strong case in favor of increasing the U.S. Army presence in Europe
or South Korea it is very likely to overcome Congressional resistance, based on historical
precedent.
Moreover, recent Congressional hearings indicate that U.S. legislators believe it is
time to reinforce the Army’s forward-stationed presence overseas. In particular, Senator
John McCain (R-AZ), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has been quite
clear in his desire to see an increase in the size of the forward-stationed U.S. military.
Chairman McCain has argued, “changes to force posture will be necessary” even though
they will “not [be] budget neutral.” For this reason, McCain argues that the United States
must nonetheless “plan to spend additional resources over the next five years to reset our
global force posture.”154
If members of Congress such as Senator McCain really wish to see increased deterrence of U.S. adversaries and assurance of U.S. allies, they could take two steps to explicitly rebalance overseas force posture. First, they could authorize a further increase in
Army end strength—beyond the 16,000 additional personnel authorized in the 2017
NDAA—and require the Pentagon to forward station the additional forces in Europe
and/or South Korea. This would eliminate the need for the Army to move a U.S.-stationed unit overseas in order to achieve greater balance in its force posture, something
the Army has been extremely reluctant to do in recent years. The Army and the DoD
can support this by educating Congress and explaining in Congressional testimony the
importance of increased end strength for the purposes of forward stationing.
Second, Congress could authorize and appropriate funds to normalize more Army
tours in South Korea, allowing single Soldiers, NCOs, and officers to serve 2-year tours
and those with families to serve 3-year tours. Normalizing more Army tours in South
Korea would not be inexpensive, but a standard length tour of duty there is likely to
become increasingly attractive to the average Soldier. The massive, sprawling new facilities at Camp Humphreys will be among the newest and most modern in the entire Army.
The construction of hundreds of new buildings and the addition of 2,300 acres to the
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installation will make Humphreys one of the largest overseas U.S. facilities, with amenities not seen at most stateside bases. Moreover, 21st-century South Korea is an advanced
country, home to the world’s 11th largest economy, just behind Canada and just ahead
of Russia and Australia, with per capita income of $37,740 in 2016, just behind Japan
but ahead of New Zealand, Spain, Italy, and Israel.155 In sum, a tour of duty in South
Korea in 2017 is completely unlike a tour there 40 years ago. The Army and the DoD
can support tour normalization by educating and explaining to Congress the significant
benefits in terms of interoperability, assurance, and increased morale among troops and
their families.
What Should the Army Base Overseas?
One of the most significant recurring cost elements in the rotational deployment model
is the cost of moving equipment, and the more equipment-intensive a particular type of
unit is and the heavier its equipment, the more it costs to rotate it back and forth across an
ocean, get it forward to operating sites in theater, and maneuver it for various exercises
and training events. At the same time, the benefits of tactical and operational interoperability that come with forward stationing are most useful to those units that require the
greatest depth of knowledge of local rules, regulations, customs, terrain, airspace, and
counterparts. For these reasons, the Army should consider stationing in Europe an ABCT
as well as combat aviation, air defense, command and control units, and related enablers.
In the case of Korea, the Army should return to a forward-stationed—or mostly forward-stationed—ABCT in Korea, and it should maintain combat aviation, air defense,
division-level command and control, and related enabler units there. This is especially so
if the prepositioned equipment set there—KEES—is dismantled or diminished and until
port-to-fort infrastructure suitable for American M1s is appropriately upgraded between
expanded U.S. facilities south of Seoul and the border with North Korea. Personnel churn
of 8 percent per month on average associated with forward stationing in Korea diminishes the Army’s “fight tonight” capability there from the perspective of unit training
readiness, but rotational units have their own “fight tonight” hurdles, including reduced
manning levels and a lack of cultural fluency and local knowledge. Moreover, since rotationally deployed troops remain subject to personnel moves out of theater, the personnel
churn argument in favor of rotational deployments is rendered mostly moot.
Implicitly, the recommendations above point to relying on infantry brigade combat
team (IBCT) or SBCT units for any necessary rotational deployments. However, given the
negative personnel- and family-related repercussions associated with heel-to-toe rotational deployments (regardless of unit type), the Army should consider ending such rotations and instead conduct shorter-term, periodic but regular rotations of IBCT and SBCT
units from the United States to Europe and South Korea. This would enable those units
to experience overseas training environments, build familiarity with foreign partner militaries, and conduct deployment- and RSOI-related training.
Exercising deployment/RSOI for heavy and/or equipment-intensive units or those
requiring in-depth specialized overseas knowledge through regular rotational deployments certainly builds unit readiness. Indeed, this is precisely the type of activity
those U.S.-stationed units would conduct in the event of a major overseas contingency.
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However, for the purposes of assurance and deterrence today, it is more effective and
efficient for the United States to station those units overseas.
Where Should the Army Forward Station?
With regard to the Korean Peninsula, obviously additional forward-stationed units
should be positioned in South Korea—there is little point in considering any other countries. In contrast, there are at least two significant options in Europe—Germany and
Poland. Stationing an ABCT in Germany, along with combat aviation, air defense, artillery and rocket systems, command and control, and enablers necessary for effective and
efficient deterrence and assurance, would have the benefit of getting those critical capabilities on the ground in theater. Given the challenges posed by Russia—with interior
lines of communication and transportation—speed of assembly and movement is critically important to forward U.S. commanders.156 Forward stationing in Germany would
facilitate this, even though it could mean an end to heel-to-toe armored presence in Eastern Europe. As noted earlier, this study assumed that if armored and other critical units
were forward-stationed somewhere in Europe, that Washington would discontinue heelto-toe rotations of an ABCT to seven countries across Eastern Europe. Instead, it seems
more likely that the United States would use its new forward-stationed forces, including
an ABCT, to conduct periodic exercises across Eastern Europe, satisfying the requirement
for efficient and effective deterrence and assurance.
At the same time, any increase in the Army’s forward stationing posture is likely to
have greater assurance and deterrent effects if it is stationed, in part or in whole, east
of Germany. Poland’s President Andrzej Duda gave voice to a view common among
America’s newest allies in NATO when he argued that the location of NATO’s military
facilities and force structure in Europe revealed that Germany is actually regarded as
the alliance’s eastern edge.157 Duda is not alone among U.S. allies in Eastern Europe who
believe that if they are truly to be the alliance’s eastern flank, then NATO military forces
ought to be arrayed permanently on Eastern European soil. For these and other reasons,
it is clear that the assurance effect of forward stationing will be most significant if units
are positioned in Poland.
There are also important operational reasons for stationing any additional units in
Europe in Poland. First, Poland has much greater geographic depth than the Baltic States
(see Figure 15). In the most dangerous conventional threat scenario of an overt Russia
attack, U.S. forces in the Baltics might be quickly overrun, and reinforcement and resupply efforts would likely be very difficult, especially considering the rail gauge difference
between the Baltic countries on the one hand, and Poland and most of the rest of Europe
on the other.
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Figure 15. Map of Poland.158
Moreover, Poland is home to the Drawsko Pomorskie training area (DPTA), which at
340 square kilometers is far larger than training areas in any of the Baltic States. DPTA
provides live-fire and maneuver training capabilities, and it has an airstrip, barracks, and
a railhead with links to nearby Baltic Sea ports—including the port of Szczecin, which is
just 55 miles away.
Additionally, Poland has been an eager consumer of American military hardware.
Forward stationing American units in Poland would help to not only strengthen this
trend, but it would also do much to spur increased interoperability between U.S. and
Polish military forces.
Finally, Poland is eager to host American forces. Polish Government officials have
privately and publicly evinced a willingness to cost-share, for example on forward operating sites used currently by rotationally deployed U.S. forces. If Washington can agree
to joint use of any facilities that might permanently host U.S. forces forward-stationed
there, Poland is more likely to provide infrastructure funding that could dramatically
reduce the costs of forward stationing.159
Of course, forward stationing anything larger than a battalion in Poland may be
viewed by some U.S. allies in NATO as a violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
This political agreement—not a legally binding treaty—signed in 1997 committed the
NATO allies to avoid permanently stationing substantial combat forces on the territory
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of the former Warsaw Pact states.160 At the same time, the NATO-Russia Founding Act
obligates Russia to “exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in
Europe.” It is obvious that Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, its ongoing invasion
of eastern Ukraine, and its massive exercises on the borders of NATO allies (such as the
Zapad series) are not examples of “restraint.”161 Nevertheless, NATO remains for the
time being committed to what some within the alliance consider the moral high ground,
effectively hobbling itself through its overly restrictive interpretation of and adherence
to the Founding Act.
It is possible that the United States could split-base an ABCT or other relevant units
between Poland and Germany. At present, the only split-based brigade in the U.S. Army
is the 173rd IBCT, with most units stationed in Vicenza, Italy, and some elements stationed in Germany. Split-basing presents major challenges for the brigade commander,
but it may be a way to keep armor in Poland on a continuous basis while remaining
below the Founding Act threshold.
Alternatively, it is certainly feasible that the United States could simply base an ABCT
in Poland entirely outside the context of NATO. This would technically enable the United
States to avoid running afoul of the Founding Act’s provisions. However, it is very likely
that this act would not find favor in Berlin in particular, which would not draw so fine a
distinction between a NATO-sanctioned forward-stationed ABCT and one stationed in
Poland solely under the terms of an agreement between Washington and Warsaw.162
Nevertheless, the United States and its allies must avoid falling into a short-term solution that proves ultimately problematic. Political sensibilities can evolve in countries like
Germany—witness for example the dramatic changes that have occurred with regard to
use of force and expeditionary operations by the Bundeswehr. With dialogue and negotiation, it may be possible to begin the long road to having NATO declare the Founding Act
inoperative. This would facilitate a more strategic approach to forward stationing and the
key, unique role it plays in deterrence and assurance.
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